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WITHOUT THE LAW H
'Without the Law' Administrative Justiceand Legal Pluralismin NineteenthCentury England.By H.W. Arthurs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1985.
Reviewed by Robert W. Gordon.*
This is a work of history - mostly, as I shall argue, very good
history. But make no mistake about it, Harry Arthurs's purpose in writing
this book is not in the least antiquarian, but present minded and polemical.
He is out to slay a dragon. The dragon is 'Legal Centralism', otherwise
known, in the classic formulation of A.V. Dicey, 1 as the Rule of Law.

Legal Centralism, as Arthurs explains it, is the dogma that there
exists (in England and other polities governed on English legal models,
including Canada and presumably also the U.S.) a dominant normative
order, defined by a general set of rules and principles (the law), emanating
from the state, governing all members of society equally and impersonally,
and enforced and applied through the ordinary courts. An important
corollary of the dogma is that there can be no rival sovereigns, no "Alsatia
where the King's writ does not run," no coordinate or superior sources
of normative direction or coercive enforcement. Alternatively, at least
to the extent there are such rivals, their actions must be made subject
to the Rule of Law by means of review in the ordinary courts. Any
rule-making, dispute-settling, norm-creating group or institution that is
not a court or accountable to a court, or required to employ a court
as its enforcement arm, or is not part of the state, or is not administered
through legal professionals has nothing to do with 'law' in any meaningful
sense and has thus no claim on the attention of lawyers; or, at least
- in case practising lawyers should be so perverse as to involve themselves
with such extralegal institutions - no claim on the attention of legal
scholars.
Arthurs's description of Legal Centralism resembles Weber's notion
of formal-legal rationality, but with an Anglo-American tilt in favour
ofjudicial rationality. The modem liberal state, in the Legal Centralist's
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view of things, has emerged from the pluralist jungle of overlapping
and competing jurisdictions of mediaeval primary groups - feudal
manors, churches, free cities, gilds, patriarchal households, et cetera as the dominant or universal order to which all others must be subordinate.
The state is the monopolist of legitimate coercion - legitimate because
coercion is regularly and rationally imposed through the forms of law.
But, whereas for Weber the paradigm rational-legal institution of the
modem state was the bureaucracy, for Dicey, of course, it was the 'ordinary
courts' applying 'ordinary law' in reviewing the applications to individual
subjects of the rules made by Parliament and its bureaucratic minions.
Legal Centralism, thus defined, is both descriptive and normative. It claims
that the Anglo-Saxon polities have actually evolved toward the condition
of the rule-of-law (the primacy of formal state law applied through the
ordinary courts). Also, it posits that condition as the desirable order of
things, the order against which current regimes must be tested and judged
and deviant practices condemned. Lord Hewart was acting as the
quintessential Legal Centralist, by Arthurs's definition, when in 1929
he branded as "the New Despotism" the increasing delegation of law-2
making authority in the English welfare state to administrative bodies.
So were the American lawyers recently described by Jerold Auerbach,
who, unable to tolerate the speed and informality of commercial arbitration, superimposed upon it layers of judicial reviewability that
defeated most of its purposes. 3 So too, of course, are those law teachers
of the present day who decline to teach or write about the decisional
practices of administrators or arbitrators on the ground that, until or
unless such practices are subject to judicial review, they have nothing
to do with 'law'.
Evidently 'Legal Centralism' is not a single, simple thing but a cluster
of things, a protean term encompassing a wide variety of attitudes and
practices: belief in the sovereignty of the state and the separation of
powers, specifically the channelling of the exercise of state authority
through judicial forms; a corresponding drive to submit to judicial control
such subordinate sub-state associations and non-judicial state organs as
appear to exercise pseudo-legal authority, or else to eliminate them
entirely; and, finally, a cultural predisposition to depreciate the claims
to legitimacy - and to ignore the pervasive de facto reality - of nonjudicial agencies and sub-state associations acting as institutions of
governance. Legal Centralism is a classical-liberal lawyer's vision of

2 Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (London: E. Benn, 1945, 1929).
3 J.s. Auerbach, Justice Without Law? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
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governance, a vision - if one were to try to sum it up in a phrase
- of the common-law state.
Arthurs's aim is to demolish the ideology of Legal Centralism in
all its aspects. As description, he argues, it is bad history and bad sociology;
as a normative ideal, it is flawed, problematic, demonstrably unfortunate
in many of its instantiations; as a culture, it is intellectually stultifying.
He wants to identify and isolate as primarily a lawyers' ideology a sort
of fantasy of ideal order that the legal profession has constructed in
order to magnify the importance of the peculiar practices in which lawyers
and judges have achieved their monopolies and special competencies;
but it is such an influential ideology that it has spread out and attracted
adherents among many other groups as well.
II
Against the claims of Legal Centralism, or at least as a supplementary
notion, Arthurs wishes to assert the claims to historical and present
actuality and to the frequently superior decisional capacity of an alternative
vision of institutional practices that he calls 'Legal Pluralism'. Legal
Pluralism is never quite as well defined as Legal Centralism, and, in
fact, tracing its contours involved Arthurs in some conceptual difficulties,
which I will return to. His book's chief device for elaborating, by example,
the concept of Legal Pluralism and establishing its claims to our preference
is to rescue from relative oblivion a marvelously interesting collection
of extrajudicial regulatory and dispute-settlement organs that proliferated
in England between 1830 and 1870 - that is, in the very period in
which the ideology of Legal Centralism came to full flowering. Arthurs,
among other things, seeks to explain this paradox: How did Centralism
come to triumph as the ruling ideology with the reality of Pluralism
all around it?
The standard story of this period, much influenced by Legal-Centralist thinking, has been that it witnessed the gradual obsolescence of
the remnants of the old local and customary rivals to central state
adjudication - manor courts, stannary courts, forest courts, and the like.
Arthurs partially confirms this story, but with a bitter twist: these pluralist
rivals did not simply decay - they were hounded into extinction. The
legal profession and common-law judges organized determined attempts
to eliminate customary local law where they could and subjected
arbitration and administration to strict review. Among the more interesting
victims of Centralist reform were the courts of requests in the principal
cities, presided over by lay justices who tried small claims in an informal
manner, providing (according to their admirers) simple, equitable, and
relatively cheap and accessiblejustice in a particularizing and paternalistic
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spirit, serving primarily (according to both admirers and detractors) as
debt collectors. 4 Motives of reformers were mixed. Some were Benthamite
rationalists, who could not tolerate the sloppiness of this local 'kadi justice'
and wanted it brought under the control of a uniform system of rules.
Some were common lawyers, revolted by deviations from familiar pleading
and review procedures, and still more so by competition from the amateur
attorneys and lay justices who represented clients and sat on these courts.5
Some were business people who wanted still more efficient machines
for debt collection. As Arthurs later relates, Benthamites, common lawyers,
and business people were to split on most other reform issues, but their
collaboration doomed the courts of requests along with most of the other
similar survivals of communal justice.
So far the Centralist's Whig history is more or less vindicated, though
Arthurs, who has a soft spot for these local, informal tribunals, is disinclined
to call it a history of progress. Yet the main theme of his book is that
the trend toward centralization was overwhelmed by a much more
important set of countertrends toward the creation of decentralized
institutions.
These countertrends were partially manifested in the increasing
demand by commercial groups for dispute-settlement procedures that
were faster, cheaper, and more in tune with particular trade practices
and norms than the common-law courts, which had long been regarded
by merchants as treacherous and alien. What followed, in Arthurs's
fascinating account, was a long period of tussling between business people
and lawyers to settle whether commercial arbitration tribunals would
be given any legal recognition at all and, if they were, how far they
would be 'legalized' in their procedures and personnel, and how far
subjected to judicial review. The outcomes of this struggle were paradoxical. Arbitration - despite the intense hostility of lawyers who argued
that merchant tribunals were staffed with incompetent judges whose
particularizing decisions would frustrate the growth of a certain and
uniform legal science of principle - grew more common. Indeed, it
was promoted by judges sending complex disputes out to 'reference'.
But, as arbitrations increased, so did the demands of parties for coercive
enforcement of awards, which could only be had through the courts.
This offered the lawyers and judges, as it always has, their opening to
push for legalization. Moreover, as the historians Robert Ferguson and

4 H.W. Arthurs, Without the Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 26-34.
5 Ibid. at 43-44.
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David Sugarman have pointed out6 and as Arthurs here confirms, the
fact that merchants had to depend ultimately on the common-law system
to enforce their contracts actually helped them to establish their autonomy
from legal regulation. By drafting trade-made law in standard form
contracts to displace state-made law, business people recruited state
sanctions to the enforcement of commercial norms. Thus, the relation
of state to non-state, judicial to non-judicial, law making depicted in
this chapter, though oppositional in the rhetoric of business and lawyers'
groups, was practically symbiotic. 7
At the heart of Arthurs's project is his history of mid-nineteenthcentury administrative agencies. There were many kinds of these, but
the most important for his purposes were the inspectorate and the
independent regulatory commission. The inspectorate, set up by the
FactoryAct of 1833, was responsive both to government reformers' desire
for a more efficient way of policing work conditions than trying to get
the courts to impose criminal sanctions and to owners' hostility to
toughening such sanctions. Inspectors were at first given power to make
regulations and had unreviewable authority (co-ordinate with the justices')
to punish violators. In 1844, they lost both of these powers but picked
up in exchange more areas of responsibility and the power to make
remedial orders, which were sent to arbitration if contested. Ultimate
coercive enforcement after 1844 reverted to the courts, which were
notoriously unco-operative with the inspectors.8 Judicial review, which
drafters of administrative statutes usually tried to preclude or limit, was
reinstated. By the 1850s, there was a decided swing in favour of full
review.9 The story of the mines inspectorate is a similar one. In the
face of steady owners' resistance, the government gradually expanded
the administrative functions of inspectors. But enforcement had to go
through the resolutely obstructive mechanisms of both criminal and civil
justice - corrupt local coroners and petit juries, biased judges, and very
expensive litigation. This system, Mines Inspector Mackworth concluded
in 1854, had given owners a "practical immunity from all responsibility."
He added:
During [the inspectorate's] three years' existence, there has not been a single
conviction obtained, although about 3,000 lives were sacrificed. In no instance
I believe in England, were the widows and children of the sufferers able to recover

6 See R.Ferguson, "The Adjudication of Commercial Disputes and the Legal System in Modem
England" (1980) 7 Brit. JL. & Soc'y 141; and J. Sugarman, "Legality, Ideology and the State
in England, 1750-1914" in D. Sugarman, ed., Legaity, Ideology and the State (London: Academic
Press, 1983).
7 See Arthurs, supra, note 4 at 56-77.
8 Ibid. at 103-106.
9 Ibid. at 146-48.
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compensation, however great the neglect or default which caused the death of
those on whom they depended for subsistence.10

Nonetheless, Arthurs insists, the inspectors made surprisingly effective
use of their confined authority. Though they could not coerce, they could
threaten: they bargained and cajoled with mine owners; they used their
reports and the newspapers to reach the middle-class Victorian conscience
with stories of working conditions; they stimulated engineers to design
safer technologies, and owners to take preventive measures; and they
drafted and lobbied for new legislation expanding their powers. By gradual
degrees, they nudged and wheedled factory and mine owners into higher
levels of compliance: "[A]bove all, they secured, through all the formal
and informal activities recounted here, adherence to law's purposes and
policies.""
The Independent Regulatory Commissions, responsive only to Parliamentary rather than ministerial control, of the 1830s and 1840s were
among the most creative of such administrative bodies at leveraging
their limited powers to give or withhold benefits. For example, the Railway
Commission parlayed its authority to certify railways as 'complete' into
2
flexible techniques for what we would now call 'negotiated regulation'.'
The Railway Commission, too, was temporarily wrecked on the reef
of Centralist ideology when, from 1854 to 1873, administrative jurisdiction over rates and routes was "exiled ... into the wilderness of a

reluctant and inept Court of Common Pleas."' 3 In 1873, Parliament finally
judged that Court's cumbrous procedures an ineffective method for
carrying out its legislative mandate and revived the Commission. Unfortunately, it was in a form so weak as to render it rather ineffectual,
4
though far less so than Common Pleas had been.'
The story Arthurs relates is thus one of the gradual expansion, against
heavy opposition and with many setbacks, of administrative alternatives
to judicial regulation. Opposition to administration came from complexly
mixed motives and interests. Much of it was inspired, of course, by
regulated interests - entrepreneurs who believed correctly that the courts,
committed to slow and expensive adjudication and staffed by laissezfaire-minded judges, could often wear out the meagre enforcement
resources of the bureaucrats. But Arthurs finds insufficient this instrumental explanation for the actions of the chief opposition leaders, who
10 Cited in Arthurs, ibid.at 108.
11Ibid. at 115.
12 Ibid. at 120.

'3 Ibid

at 126.
14 Ibid. at 126-29.
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were mostly lawyers. Some, of course, were lawyers for powerful client
groups; others feared the loss of business, though in England, as elsewhere,
the growth of administration brought forth fruit in abundant new sources
of lawyers' business. Yet many were genuine ideologues of Legal
Centralism, committed believers in the common-law state. They took
for granted that law was unsafe in any but judicial hands working through
judicial procedures; that where common-lawyers' law was absent, there
was nothing but 'discretion'. The Crown's law officers, for instance,
habitually interpreted statutes conferring administrative authority in a
common-law conventional as well as narrowly restrictive way. 5 Lawyers
generally professed -

and doubtless sincerely believed -

that by

professional training and experience they simply knew the art of competent
and principled decision making in a way no one else could know it.16
Though Arthurs gives the common lawyers credit for sincere belief,
he savages the belief itself. At the height of the apparent dominance
of Centralist ideology, he points out, the roles of the courts in administering
vast areas of social and economic life - compared to that of private,
associational, and administrative rule making and dispute settlement was relatively small. Where the courts took over administrative tasks
directly or reviewed administrative action, so far from knowing what
they were doing, they were inert and incompetent. So far from being
principled in adjudication, they caved in repeatedly to ad hoc pressures
from local and entrepreneurial interests. So far from being neutral
executors of Parliamentary will, they read regulatory statutes so restrictively as to frequently nullify legislative intent. If what the ideal liberal
subject of the time wanted was predictable and uniform application of
the laws, the place he could least expect to get it was from the courts.
Indeed, as Arthurs observes in one of the most pointed ironies of
his study, the utilitarian law reformers were driven to try to supplant
judicial with arbitral and administrative bodies precisely because they
felt they had little hope of realizing their own centralizing and rationalizing
ambitions through the courts and the common law. Like Bentham, they
had come to think of the courts and the common law as a hopelessly
irrational muddle. The leading inspectors, commissioners, and senior
departmental officers were as much centralizers in spirit as their commonlaw opponents; they were often also lawyers, but ones who regarded
traditional lawyers and judges as obstacles to their version of the Centralist
7
program of rational legislation and administration.'
15

Ibid. at 156-57.

16

Ibid. at 175-76.

17 Ibid. at 180-83.
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Traditional legal ideology thus probably helped to stimulate institutional innovation much more than it retarded it. The inefficiency and
bias of the courts led reformers to create supplementary institutions.
Professional jealousy of any extrajudicial activity that smelled even faintly
of adjudication forced administrators to develop novel instruments of
regulation - the practical techniques of modem administrative law such as publicity, safety technologies, negotiation, and conditional licensing. The upshot was that the two conflicting ideologies of Centralism
combined to produce a de facto Pluralism, a wild proliferation of
competing regulatory jurisdictions. The common-law ideology, though
very influential at key moments, never succeeded in occupying the whole
field. It mainly worked to keep extrajudicial institutions off balance,
suspect, marginal to real law, and doubtfully legitimate; but, increasingly,
it was the extrajudicial institutions that gathered up the reins of governance.
III
Arthurs's book is a remarkable accomplishment. The reader with
the patience to thread the maze of its complex argument will be well
rewarded. Arthurs has exhumed a fascinating sunken civilization, the
underground juridical life of mid-nineteenth-century England. Indeed,
my only complaint about the descriptive parts of his book is that there
are not more of them, that he does not relate in more detail the doings
of his arbitrators, inspectors, and commissioners. He is prodigal with
quotations from the parochial and vindictive legal foes of administration
but curiously abstract in narrative and stingy with illustration of administrative ingenuity - reports, circulars, certificates of convenience,
recommendations to Parliament, et cetera. He has also valuably reemphasized that the terms of ideological struggle between proponents
of two models of rationality, the judicial and the administrative, which
we are accustomed to locating in twentieth-century battles over the
legitimacy of the regulatory and welfare states, were really established
much earlier. Almost every argument against or in favour of judicial
supremacy or administrative discretion made by apologists or opponents
of the New Deal was already well rehearsed by 1850. All this is well
worth saying, as is the debunking of the Whiggish view of the courts
and legal profession - pictured here as generally reactionary, corrupt,
incompetent, or ineffectual, and concerned mainly to preserve their own
jurisdiction and profits - as the protectors of the liberties of the subject.
Finally, Arthurs is very fair minded. Though a man with a mission, he
is anything but a single-minded ideologue. My summary has not even
come close to conveying the subtlety of his account, its flair for paradox
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and ironic consequences, its careful qualifications, and its attention to
contradicting detail.
So it should not be taken to detract from my admiration of Arthurs's
achievement if I raise a few quarrels with him. These are quarrels mostly
over matters of omission and emphasis; the careful reader of Arthurs's
book will see that he has briefly anticipated most of them anyway.
1. Antecedents. Arthurs's Pluralist thesis is, of course, the latest in a long
line of such theses. For a legal historian, he is strangely silent about
those who came before. Harold Laski is not in his index, although
it is Laski, along with J.N. Figgis, F.W. Maitland, Otto von Gierke,
and Leon Duguit,18 who usually comes to mind when one hears the
word 'Pluralism'. Indeed, their Pluralism, with its insistence on recognition of a multitude of associational groups in society, competing
with the state as sources of 'sovereignty' (normative allegiance and
effective sanctions), is not unlike Arthurs's own. These political
Pluralists were concerned with vindicating, against the intensifying
power of a centralizing state on the one hand and of an atomizing
individualism on the other, the claims to self-government of associations, such as trade unions and churches, and to enlarge the
opportunities for people to realize their political and spiritual goals
through participation in such groups. They also wanted, as Arthurs
does, to urge that, for good or ill (and they were understandably
ambivalent about its virtues), the law-making and governance roles
of substate associations, especially business corporations, was a sociological reality and one that should therefore find recognition in legal
categories. Theirs is a rich tradition, which has attracted a rich body
of criticism. The reader is naturally curious to know what Arthurs
makes of them.
Arthurs's more immediate predecessors are surely the (chiefly
American) Realists of the 1920s and 1930s - R.L. Hale, James Landis,
Thurman Arnold, Walton Hamilton, Louis Jaffe, and their like. They
also do not appear in his book, though ideas uncannily like theirs
echo all through it.19 A typically hilarious early article (1932) of
18 HJ. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917);
J.N. Figgis, Studies of Political Thoughtfrom Gerson to Grotius: 1414-1625 (Cambridge: University
Press, 1956); 0. Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. F.W. Maitland (Cambridge:
University Press, 1958); 0. Gierke, Associations and Law: The Classicaland Early ChristianStages,
trans. G. Iteiman (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977); L. Duguit, Law in the Modem State,
trans. F. and W. Laster (New York: H. Fertion, 1970).
19 R.L. Hale, Freedom Through Law: Public Control Private Governing Power (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1952); J.M. Landis, The Administrative Process (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1951); T. Arnold, "The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process" (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 617; W.H. Hamilton, The PoliticsofIndustry: FiveLectures Delivered
to the William W. Cook Foundation at the University of Michigan, Feb.-Mar., 1955 (New York:
Knopf, 1957); L. Jaffe, "Law Making by Private Groups" (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 201.
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Arnold's 20 sounds all the Arthurian themes: that lawyers and legal
scholars absurdly mystify the value and importance of judge-made
law, while depreciating, deligitimating, or simply ignoring the vastly
more consequential law-making functions of administrative bureaus
and private associations. 21 Jaffe published in 1937 his fundamental
"Law Making by Private Groups," 22 which was written shortly after
the U.S. Supreme Court, in a fit of Legal Centralist indignation, had
condemned the devolution, through the National Industrial Recovery
Act and Bituminous Coal ConservationsAct, of law-making authority
onto private trade associations as unconstitutional delegations of public
power. 23 Jaffe pointed out some hundreds of ways in which individuals
and groups assumed and exercised the power to make legally binding
rules for the conduct of others: trespass-to-property sanctions to
legislate segregated theatres and restaurants; contract sanctions to
enforce trade-association agreements, union closed shops, stockexchange rules, and industrial standards; and devolution of formal
regulatory authority on professions and licensed occupations, commodity producers' groups, neighbourhood associations, sewer districts,
and countless other bodies.
Arthurs has done useful service in calling our attention to the
fact that the proliferation of such novel law-making authorities was
20 Arnold, !bid
21 Ibid at 624-25, 627.
The distinction between bureaus and courts is important. Courts are bound by precedent,
and bureaus are bound by red tape. Of course courts are forced to follow precedent even
when it leads to absurd results because of their solemn obligation not to do anything in
the future very much different from what they have done in the past. But bureaus in allowing
themselves to be bound by red tape do so out of pure malice and lack of regard for the
fundamentals of freedom, because they have taken the oath not to violate the rules and
analogies of the past. Therefore they are much worse than courts because courts only act
unreasonably when they can't help it, and bureaus act unreasonably when it is in their power
to do differently....
Yet in spite of the comparative unimportance of what they do, courts appear to have
found a way of doing it which has brought them overwhelming prestige and respect. They
seem to have induced the feeling, even among persons who know nothing of court methods
and have never been inside a court room, that there they will find protection. Even when
they fail miserably to give protection to someone who seeks it, such is their demeanor and
attitude that he - or at least his friends - feel that it was not the fault of the court that
protection failed. Perhaps it was the fault of the legislature, perhaps of the jury - at least
the court did the best it could, and had it done otherwise it would have, in some mysterious
way, imperilled the whole system of protection to others. Commissions, composed of experts,
can be violently criticized by editorial writers. But if the matter is appealed to a non-expert
court, sitting on the same question and using the same criteria, it appears to be settled
in the only way possible under the law. Our quarrel is, then, with the law, which we must
respect until it is changed, and not with the court which applied it.
22 Jaffe, supra, note 19.
23 A.LA. Schechter Poulry Corp. v. U.S. (1935), 295 U.S. 495 and Carterv. CarterCoal Co.
(1936), 298 U.S. 238.
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not so novel after all, that Realists such as Jaffe and Arnold could
have written much the same pieces about England a century earlier,
but the Realists' writings helped to form the modern legal consciousness
on these issues, and their formulations are so powerful as to be well
worth reading still. Recent work by Professor R.C.B. Risk reveals
that the Realists attracted some Canadian disciples too, legal writers
such as John Willis who produced a strain of deviant, but brilliant
scholarship about administrative law. 24 It is a strain that Arthurs could
25
be said to have inherited.
2. Vestigial Spell of the Public-PrivateDistinction. This recollection of
Arthurs's predecessors in his project has the effect of making me
wonder - perhaps unfairly, for a broader-based scholar than Arthurs
would be hard to come by - whether he has not focussed the attention
of his work too narrowly, under the spell of the very Legal Centralism
he seeks to dissipate. The Centralist vice is its consignment of nonjudicial and non-state ('private') law making to the nether world of
Not Law. Yet Arthurs uses basically Centralist criteria to identify most
of his objects of study - the administrative and private agencies and
tribunals that have appropriated areas of jurisdiction that traditionally
belonged to courts and were handled by adjudication. This is a perfectly
sensible focus, especially if one wants, as Arthurs does, to write the
history of Centralist ideology; it was against precisely those institutions
that tried to mimic or displace adjudication that Centralist lawyers
directed their jealous range. But I cannot help thinking that the focus
diverts attention from some of the main historical actions of the time.
The main point that the fin-de-sice Pluralists (Maitland, Gierke,
et cetera,) wanted to make was that the Legal-Centralist model of
the relation of the state to the subject was already obsolete by the
time Dicey wrote his Law of the Constitution in 1885. By that time,
the incredible proliferation in the industrial countries of interest groups
and intermediate associations - corporations, trusts, cartels, trade
unions, marketing associations, political parties, lobbying groups thickly interwoven in a quasi-official legal space "were overflowing
the juridical categories of the nineteenth-century state" 26 and crying
out for recognition in political theory and legal doctrine. Arthurs's
24 R.C.B. Risk, "John Willis -

A Tribute" (1985) 9 Dal. LJ.521.

25 Arthurs does acknowledge the strong influence on his work of another modem offshoot
of Realism, the law-and-society movement. For an argument for Legal Pluralism closely paralleling
Arthurs's from a leading law-and-society scholar, see M. Galanter, "Justice in Many Rooms: Courts,
Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law" (1981) 19 J.Legal Pluralism 1 at 19.

26 C.Maier, "Fictitious Bonds ...of Wealth and Law: On the Theory and Practice of Interest
Representation" in S. Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatisrm
and the Transfornationof Politics (Cambridge: University Press, 1981) at 27,41,43.
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history, once again, does valuable service in reminding us that those
juridical categories were always mythic, that the common-law state
had never had any real existence. Max Weber commented that the
formal generality of centralized law was being increasingly challenged
by anti-formal tendencies - social groups' demands for substantive
justice, populist demands for lay justice, corporate interest-groups'
demands for arbitration, corporate self-regulation and trade-sensitive
dispute settlement, and expert specialized agencies. 27 Some writers
supposed the state had disappeared entirely except as the medium
for (or, at best, the honest broker of) the struggle of interest groups.
"When the groups are adequately stated," Arthur Bentley intoned in
a famous edict, "everything is stated. When I say everything, I mean
28
everything."
The most perceptive of the Realists deepened the critique of Legal
Centralism beyond the demonstration that the social conditions of
modem life and the multiplication of intermediate groups with some
pretensions to sovereignty had hopelessly blurred the distinction
between public law making (under the colour of governmental, official
authority) and merely private action. The Realist point was that the
distinction had never been valid to begin with because it ignored all
the ways in which ordinary private law, the law of property and contract,
devolved the public power of effective coercion onto private individuals
and firms. 29 A person makes law every time he or she says, "You
can't smoke [join a union, quit work before six, et cetera,] on my
property" on pain of suffering the trespass sanction, fully reinforced,
if necessary, by state violence. The Realist R.L. Hale, responding to
Legal-Centralist objections to labour-arbitration tribunals vested with
non-judicially reviewable legal authority, argued not so much that
such quasi-official groups were already common in society (though
he might have done, since they were) as that employers already
exercised coercive legal authority as property owners and contracting
parties - an arbitrary and unreviewable authority at that.30 The English
common-law courts of Dicey's generation, committed though they
claimed to be to maintaining legal authority in state and judicial forms,
were actually engaged in wholesale handing over of the legal power
27 M. Rheinstein, ed., Max Weber on Law and Economy in Society (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1966) 303-21.

28 A.F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1967) at 208-9.
29 M.R. Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty" (1927) 13 Cornell L.Q. 8; R.L. Hale, "Coercion
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State" (1923) 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470.
30 R.L. Hale, "Law Making by Unofficial Minorities" (1920) 20 Colum. L. Rev. 451.
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to set the terms of economic life (much of it in former times actually
exercised by courts, such as wage and price regulation) to private
firms allowed full liberty to regulate the terms of access to their
property, to consolidate, and even to cartelize through contract.
Arthurs's hardy little bands of arbitrators and commissioners tend to
pale in importance as law-making entities in contrast to the business
corporations that received huge delegations of uncontrolled sovereignty
at the urging of lawyers and judges who piously insisted that public
rule making must be kept accountable to "ordinary courts and ordinary
law."

31

Hardly one to be accused of lacking sophistication, Arthurs sees
these aspects of his subject but, except at occasional moments when
he refers to them explicitly, keeps them off to one side, as it were
at the corner of his eye. Can we speculate about why he does so?
One (entirely sufficient) reason is that one cannot write about all nonjudicial regulators in one book; it makes sense, if one's project is
to broaden the parochial lawyers' field of vision by gradual degrees,
to begin with an account of those institutions that most nearly duplicated
the functions of ordinary courts. Another reason, I suspect, is the
vestigial spell of the public-private distinction, which makes us still
think of public faces of justice and regulation and even private ones
aping the forms and manners of public ones as somehow basically
different from standard-form mortgages, insurance classification
guidelines, bankers' policies on credit extensions, factory operating
manuals, or personnel review boards. Finally, though in parentheses,
footnotes, and asides, Arthurs can be a hardheaded skeptic about nonjudicial governance too; his book projects a clear conviction of the
superiority of non-judicial to judicial regulation. One is entitled to
wonder, if the business corporation rather than the administrative
agency were elevated to the status of paradigm Pluralist regulator,
whether that conviction could always be sustained.
3. Pluralism in the Modem World. This thought suggests a final set of
reflections. Arthurs has written a polemic plainly intended for our
own time. What is the contemporary force of his critique of Legal
Centralism and his promotion of Pluralism as a substitute? The question
has a special point because, although at times his thesis reminds one
31 "The common law commitment to contractual liberalism, and (far more than in the United
States) the readiness of firms to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than litigation, meant that

British courts had a far less active regulatory role than their American counterparts. The fifty
major British industrial companies figured in only twenty-two reported cases from 1895 to 1935'"
M. Keller, "The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 19001930" in T.K. McCraw, ed., Regulation in Perspective: HistoricalEssays (Boston: Div. of Research,
Grad. School of Bus. Admin., Harvard University, 1981) at 56, 64.
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of the (now seemingly) naive enthusiasm for administration of reformers from Chadwick to Landis, he has lived through a period of
considerable disillusionment with the capacities of administrative
agencies to engage in the efficient and progressive supervision of the
economy and with the capacities of corporatist trade associations and
collective bargaining to 'rationalize' the terms of industrial competition
and strife. The state bureaucracies, in particular, have come under
savage criticism from both right and left for the very faults that Arthurs
finds with nineteenth-century courts: they are considered to be encrusted with expensive, slow-moving procedures, captured by specialinterest clienteles, lazy and inefficient, insufficiently politically account32
able, et cetera.
It is instructive to compare Arthurs's view with, for example,
Professor Theodore Lowi's well-known critique of (Lowi's own view
of what is entailed by) Pluralism. 33 Lowi views the plurality of lawmaking authorities in the modem state as undermining the positive
possibilities of Centralism, not the Centralism of Dicey's (or Friedrich
Hayek's or Richard Epstein's) common-law state, but of democratic
centralism, the strong central state ideally capable of articulating,
through clear legislative planning, something like a public interest.
Arthurs likes the proliferation of little bureaucracies and informal
dispute-settling groups because, in comparison to the common-law
state (to the limited extent such a state was once a reality), such
agencies exhibited at least some capacity to palliate the pathologies
of laissez-fairecapitalism. Lowi sees in the same phenomena the state's
authority to legislate being parcelled out, sold off piecemeal to diverse
factions and interest groups through a series of fragmented deals.
In the meantime, the courts have come to look more attractive
to modem left liberals than they did to Dicey's reformist contemporaries
precisely because, in a society whose effective rule-making authority
has been parcelled out among multiple corporate decision makers
and to government agencies frequently allied with them, few institutions
besides the courts have possessed any independent leverage to hold
these Pluralist law makers accountable. In the United States, where
the judiciary is admittedly unusually activist in temper, the slogans
of Legal Centralism and the Rule of Law have delivered very concrete
32 Arthurs acknowledges these critiques. See Arthurs, supra, note 4 at 196-99. Arthurs may
also have overrated the comparative virtues of nineteenth-century bureaucracy and administrative
mentalities. Mr. Gradgrind is hardly more admirable than Mr. Tulkinghom, or the Circumlocution
Office than the Court of Chancery.
33 TJ. Lowi, The End of Liberalisn" The Second Republic of the United States, 2nd ed. (New

York: Norton, 1979); TJ. Lowi, The End of Liberalism"Ideology, Policy and the Crises of Public
Authority (New York: Norton, 1969).
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benefits to groups with limited economic power. Such groups have
on occasion been able to vindicate the more modest claims of
unorganized minorities against entrenched corporate and official
bureaucracies by persuading judges that the abstract norms of legalism
require some alteration of the ground rules of social struggle, such
as the distribution of legal entitlements and legitimate bargaining
weapons, in favour of the weaker parties. Contrary to the thrust of
Arthurs's critique, the courts in performing this role have sometimes
exhibited a technical capability, a sensitivity to local circumstance
and custom, a flair for informal mediation, a willingness to listen
to diverse political and ideological interests, and an ingenuity in
administering remedies, far exceeding those of any rival institutions
likely to have been called on to perform the same tasks. 34 Not
surprisingly, the conservative opinion that relied on aggressive judicial
review to save us from regulation through 1937 has, since 1954, been
urging strict curbs on judicial 'legislation'. However, American conservatives are likely to rediscover the virtues of the federal judiciary
now that almost half of it has been restocked with President Reagan's
appointees. Such experiences ought to remind us that calls for informal,
discretionary administration and a preference for negotiation and
bargaining over formal and adversary litigation are often just strategies
of the powerful to move authority out of institutions where they have
been losing back into contexts they are more sure to dominate. 35
Arthurs's account of the relative competences of institutions seems
to me, therefore, sometimes surprisingly abstract, an excessively formal
and inadequately social account, treating courts and administrative
bureaus as institutions with settled and continuous identities over time
and across contexts. I would urge instead, citing his book among others
in my brief, that there are no inherent attributes of judges or administrators as decision makers: each can be rigid or flexible, hidebound
or imaginative, captured or independent, depending on their personnel,
purposes, constituencies, placement in the wider political economy,
and contingent opportunities.

34 R. Cavanaugh and A. Sarat, "Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence
of Judicial Competence" (1980) 14 Law & Soc'y Rev. 371; A. Chayes, "The Role of the Judge

in Public Law Litigation" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281; T. Eisenberg & S. Yeazell, "The Ordinary
and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation" (1980) 93 Harv. L. Rev. 465; W.H. Clune, "Courts
and Legislatures as Arbitrators of Social Change" Book Review of EducationalPolicy-making and
the Courts"An EmpiricalStudy of JudicialActivism, by M.A. Rebell & A.R. Block (1984) 93 Yale

L.J. 763.
35 R.L. Abel, ed., The Politics of Informal Justice (New York: Academic Press, 1982).
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IV
Arthurs could concede all this - he does in fact here and there
concede much of it - and still insist upon the main point of his critique
of Legal Centralism: lawyers and legal scholars have badly misallocated
their resources and have overinvested both intellectual attention and
political faith in the Diceyan Rule of Law ideal. The role of courts as
law makers and reviewers of law makers was a marginal one even in
mid-nineteenth-century England and is more so today. The administrative
law text-writer and teacher who take judicial review of administrative
action as their whole subject, ignoring completely the substantive rules
made by agencies, will be wasting their substance on relatively trivial
and peripheral issues of governance.
Of course the reader is entitled to ask: If our law-making institutions
are actually Pluralist, why bother if lawyers pretend they are Centralist?
Is not the ideology of the centrality of adjudication a fairly harmless
sort of fantasy? Arthurs has argued elsewhere 36 passionately and at length
that the cult of the common-law state has been an intellectual disaster,
producing a professional culture narrowly focused on the analysis of
case law, resistant to the study of conflicting values and policies, and
actively hostile to seeing law in a social context. So narrow a focus
has political costs as well as intellectual ones. It devalues careers in
administrative service compared to those in private practice. It leads to
a naive trust in legalism; in 'rights' vindicated through lawyer-operated
quasi-adjudicative procedures as a method of controlling state and private
power without adequate regard to the expense and time and access to
legal skills needed to exercise such rights; and to underrating alternative
institutional arrangements, such as client-responsive informal professional
discretion, 37 bureaucracies organized to encourage participation by affected groups,38 and democracy. 39 Above all, it encourages the more
comfortable and privileged of us to hold the absurd delusion that the
problem of domination in social life can be adequately solved by coating
over the manifold hierarchies of political and civil society with a thin
layer of judicial process. Harry Arthurs's book is both a fine history
of some of the people who first tried to dispel that delusion and seek
other solutions and a continuation of their work.
36 Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council, Law and Learning (Chair H.W. Arthurs) (Ottawa: The Council, 1983).
37 See W.H. Simon, "Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in Welfare Administration" (1983) 92
Yale L. Rev. 1198.
38 See J.F. Handler, The Conditions of Discretion Autonomy, Community, Bureaucracy (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986).
39 See J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy: Toward a Transformation of American Society
(New York: Penguin Books, 1983).

